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capitalism in Geoff Hodgson’s work
Francesca Gagliardi and David Gindis
1.1 CELEBRATING GEOFF HODGSON
In work spanning four decades, Geoff Hodgson has made many path-
breaking contributions to institutional economics, evolutionary econom-
ics, economic methodology, the history of economic thought and social 
theory more broadly. In recognition for these lasting contributions, 
Hodgson was awarded the Veblen-Commons Prize by the Association 
for Evolutionary Economics in 2012. In 2014, he was the recipient of the 
International Joseph A. Schumpeter Society’s biennial Schumpeter Prize 
for his important book, Conceptualizing Capitalism: Institutions, Evolution, 
Future. And in 2016, his How Economics Forgot History: The Problem of 
Historical Specificity in Social Science, published in 2001, was listed in the 
top 50 economics books of the last 100 years by the World Economics 
Association. Hodgson’s reputation as a significant and prolific writer,1 
whose work transcends traditional disciplinary boundaries, is matched 
by his credentials as an academic entrepreneur, whose involvement in the 
formation of two international scholarly societies and the foundation of 
the Journal of Institutional Economics has expanded the opportunities for 
constructive dialogue among social scientists.2
To celebrate Hodgson’s fantastic career, this Festschrift brings together 
19 original contributions by world-leading scholars in specific areas that 
have played a significant role in influencing Hodgson’s thinking or repre-
sent key debates to which he has contributed. The five chapters assembled 
in Part II discuss some of the philosophical and methodological aspects 
of Hodgson’s work, and clarify the Veblenian foundations of his view 
of economic agents. Part III comprises seven chapters that position and 
engage with Hodgson’s contributions to institutional economics, while 
Part IV includes seven chapters that situate and build on his contributions 
to evolutionary economics. Inevitably, the division of chapters into parts is 
somewhat artificial. Not only do the themes discussed under the headings 
‘institutional economics’ and ‘evolutionary economics’ intersect in various 
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ways, but also the tradition that runs from Veblen to Hodgson has long 
defined itself  as ‘institutional and evolutionary economics’ (or ‘evolution-
ary and institutional economics’). In Part V, the concluding conversation 
with Hodgson covers some of the connections between the two fields.
1.2 CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE FESTSCHRIFT
Hodgson is one of the most philosophically minded economists writing 
today. Over the course of his career, he has gone to great lengths to clarify 
his philosophical and methodological positions. Part II opens with Sheila 
Dow’s (Chapter 2) discussion of the links between Hodgson’s ontological 
commitments and his epistemology. On the one hand, Hodgson believes 
that the absence of uniformity in socio-economic systems, located in 
historical time and geographical space, implies that economic explanations 
must rest on a combination of general and specific theories. This claim 
underpins his critique of excessive generalization characteristic of the 
mainstream, but also his evaluation of Adam Smith and John Maynard 
Keynes. On the other hand, Hodgson denies that the complexity of the 
subject matter, and the attendant impossibility of complete knowledge, 
justify the postmodernist credo that ‘anything goes’. Instead, Hodgson 
believes that an open-system ontology implies an open system of knowl-
edge that allows for a variety of approaches, and underlines the value 
of the pragmatist method of abduction, namely the formulation of new 
explanatory hypotheses through the creative connection of alternative 
approaches. Dow shows that, contrary to Hodgson’s assessment, both 
Smith and Keynes accepted this position.
Most economists today believe that mathematical models generate 
new explanatory hypotheses. Since most methodologists of mathematical 
modelling in economics also consider that models provide accounts of 
how real-world phenomena are produced, attention has mostly focused 
on how patently unrealistic models can nonetheless explain. Prevailing 
interpretations present models as counterfactual credible worlds or useful 
fairy tales that communicate important messages. The debate has also 
focused on whether the models’ false assumptions do any of the explain-
ing. In line with Hodgson’s view that further discussion and inquiry in this 
area is needed, Tony Lawson (Chapter 3) engages with these ideas, and 
defends the proposition that mathematical models in economics do not, 
and cannot, explain. Since models of this kind involve treating the open 
system that is social reality as a closed one, they do not merely simplify 
reality; they distort it. It is therefore hardly surprising, Lawson concludes, 
that models fail to provide insights into real-world causal relations.
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Historians of economic thought have long noted the parallels between 
mathematical models of the economy and the mathematical models used 
in physics in the late nineteenth century. In his sweeping overview of the 
relationships between economics and the natural sciences, Philip Mirowski 
(Chapter 4) notes that much of the discussion has focused on methodologi-
cal issues, such as potential explanatory isomorphisms, the uses of natural 
metaphors and the problem of scientism. But the connection between 
the two domains runs much deeper: it is epistemic and ontological. All 
Western discussions of the economy since the fifteenth century have been 
imbued with notions of nature, and the two notions have been jointly 
defining one another for centuries. As a result, Mirowski argues, claims 
that economics underwent a process of denaturalization in the second 
half  of the nineteenth century following the breakdown of the theological 
conception of nature are incorrect. To fit the new physical conception of 
nature, economics was re-natured. Not only did appropriations from the 
natural sciences continue over the course of the twentieth century, but we 
have been living through yet another bout of re-naturing the economy with 
the rise of ecology in the recent past.
While many economists were fascinated with the mathematical elegance 
of physics at the turn of the twentieth century, others, most notably 
Thorstein Veblen, turned to Darwinian evolutionary ideas. Veblen, as 
Charles Camic (Chapter 5) observes, is commonly depicted as a marginal, 
socially detached academic recluse, whose theoretical work was produced 
in isolation from his colleagues and students. This stereotype involves the 
separation of Veblen’s teaching and service activities from his ideas, as if  
the latter developed, or could have developed, without the influence of 
the former. By contrast, Camic shows that Veblen was hardly an academic 
recluse, and that his various teaching and service responsibilities at the 
University of Chicago (1892–1906) contributed to the development of 
his ideas. Veblen’s role as the managing editor of the Journal of Political 
Economy, his two terms on the Council of the American Economic 
Association, his work as a translator and his heavy involvement with 
teaching led him to interact on a practically daily basis with his profes-
sional colleagues and students around many of the very same issues he was 
writing about.
Veblen famously rejected the neoclassical view of the individual as a 
lightning calculator of pleasures and pains, and associated institutions 
with settled habits of thought and action. In line with his commitment to 
Veblenian thinking and agency-structure reasoning, Hodgson rejects the 
subjectivist conception of individuals as collections of preferences and 
views individuals in objectivist terms as distinguishable sets of habits that 
co-evolve with cumulative change in social structures and institutions. John 
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Davis (Chapter 6) draws on these ideas to propose an account of reflexive 
economic agents that explains choice behaviour in a cumulative causation 
world, in which both linear causation and circular feedback effects matter. 
Reflexive agents know that their actions can influence their habits and 
alter the basis for future action, and therefore form expectations about 
the consequences of their actions not only on the external world but also 
on themselves. But reflexive agents are reference-dependent and biased 
towards the habits they already have, Davis argues, with the implication 
that they are not only distinguishable but also re-identifiable over time.
With the stage thus set, the discussion in Part III turns to positioning 
and engaging with Hodgson’s contributions to institutional economics. 
Hodgson’s long-standing critique of the methodological individualism 
characteristic of both the mainstream and the new institutional economics 
revolves around the view that the economy is an open, evolving system 
in which actors and structures are mutually constituted. This position, as 
John Groenewegen (Chapter 7) recalls, was instrumental in the formation 
of the European Association for Evolutionary Political Economy in 1988. 
It also runs through Hodgson’s defence of the habit-based conception 
of agency characteristic of the original institutional economics and his 
various non-contractual explanations of the firm. However, according to 
Groenewegen, the boundaries between the original and the new institu-
tional economics have more recently become blurred, to the point that it 
is no longer useful to differentiate between the two. Instead, institutional 
economics can be usefully seen as belonging to a continuum along which 
different schools of thought are more complements than substitutes. This 
opens the door for multiple opportunities for mutual learning.
Hodgson’s recurring critique of the new institutional economics, Claude 
Ménard (Chapter 8) argues, serves the purpose of rehabilitating Veblenian 
institutional economics. However, although there are differences between 
Hodgson’s positions and the institutional economics associated with 
Ronald Coase, Douglass North and Oliver Williamson, a comparison 
of Hodgson’s definitions of institutions, markets and firms with those 
developed recently in the Coase–North–Williamson tradition reveals that 
these have more to do with Hodgson’s strategy of differentiation than 
with fundamental disagreements on substance. Divergences are more 
substantial when it comes to other issues that new institutionalists consider 
important but that Hodgson either rejects or overlooks. In particular, 
Ménard observes, Hodgson’s rejection of the concept of hybrid forms 
and his neglect of intermediate institutions that link the general rules of 
the game and the agents and organizations operating within these rules 
produce a somewhat amputated picture of how modern capitalist systems 
work.
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Among Hodgson’s several contributions to the theory of the firm, his 
insistence on the importance of the legal nature of the firm stands out. 
This is valuable, as Simon Deakin (Chapter 9) explains, because the study 
of the patterns of legal thought can reveal aspects of economic institutions 
that are otherwise hard to grasp. The concepts lawyers use to denote the 
firm in corporate law or employment law, for example, disclose something 
about its economic nature. But they also reveal something about the nature 
of law itself. The evolution of legal forms such as the corporation, Deakin 
argues, is the result of two conflicting pressures: on the one hand, the need 
to adjust the law to a changing external socio-economic environment, and 
on the other, the need to maintain the internal consistency of legal thought. 
Hence the gradual recognition of various forms of entity shielding and the 
assignment of legal personality to durable, self-governing associational 
arrangements was not only a historically specific development associated 
with the long process of industrialization. It was also driven by law’s need 
to maintain internal, self-referential consistency, without which the legal 
system would dissolve into a mass of undifferentiated commands.
The nature of the corporation is one of oldest controversies in legal 
theory. Like many scholars in the past, critics of the contractual theory 
of the corporation developed in the Coasean law and economics tradition 
argue that corporations are not simply creatures of contract. However, 
as Richard Langlois (Chapter 10) argues, the fact that the corporation 
cannot be constructed solely out of voluntary contract is compatible with 
the claim that it is ultimately nothing but a form of cooperation among 
rights-holding individuals. To defend this bottom-up position, Langlois 
shifts attention from contracts to rights, and specifically to the distinction 
between rights in personam, which are created by contract, and rights in 
rem, which underpin property and are created by law. Like property, the 
corporate entity is an architectural component of abstract law, as opposed 
to a concession of the state. Corporations are mechanisms through which 
owners exercise their rights, with the implication that corporations do not 
have any rights of their own. That owners retain residual control rights 
over assets shows that entity shielding achieved by corporate law does not 
diminish a corporation’s owners’ rights in rem.
Hodgson has criticized the economics of property rights, associated 
among others with Armen Alchian, on the grounds that it fails to 
distinguish property from possession. From a similar point of view, Ugo 
Pagano (Chapter 11) rejects the view that private property evolved from 
the struggle for possession. Absent a collective definition and enforcement 
of what is considered legitimate possession, this conclusion, famous results 
from evolutionary game theory notwithstanding, is unwarranted. Pagano 
combines John Stuart Mill’s theory of liberty and Wesley Newcomb 
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Hohfeld’s analysis of legal rights to show that private property is a special 
case of human rights and liberties, more suitably explained by sexual and 
group selection, with the implication that uncontested possession evolves 
from property rights rather than the reverse. Property rights can generate 
uncontested possession of rival goods but also artificially limit the poten-
tially universal possession of non-rival goods. The latter aspect underpins 
modern capitalism and the so-called knowledge economy, where intel-
lectual property rights to knowledge can become an obstacle to economic 
development by limiting liberty and implying high transaction costs.
Hodgson has been concerned not only with key institutions of capital-
ism, including property, markets and firms, but also with the nature of 
capitalism itself. In recent work, he has specified a six-condition definition 
of capitalism. Relying on the income per capita statistics made available 
in recent years, Andrew Tylecote (Chapter 12) examines what causes the 
six conditions to appear and which constraining factors might prevent the 
sustained growth that is meant to follow. The history of two transforma-
tions into capitalism that did not quite make it is particularly instructive. 
The first is the case of the Low Countries, which by the mid-seventeenth 
century had met all six conditions, but nonetheless stagnated during the 
eighteenth century, contrary to Britain, where income per capita growth 
expanded rapidly once the conditions were met. The second is the case 
of Ming China, where growth failed to manifest despite being, by some 
estimates, close to economic take-off  at around that time. The comparison 
reveals, Tylecote concludes, that the failure to build a unified home market 
can be fatal.
Overall, according to Giovanni Dosi, Luigi Marengo and Alessandro 
Nuvolari (Chapter 13), one finds two explanatory strategies in insti-
tutional economics: either institutions are derived from the choices of 
rational individuals with well-defined preferences, or preferences and 
indeed the very idea of rationality are derived from institutions. On the 
first view, institutions are crafted to perform coordinating and governance 
functions that enhance efficiency by mitigating contracting problems. 
On the latter view, institutions reproduce path-dependently in a partly 
self-organizing process, irrespective of efficiency considerations. These dif-
ferences translate into contrasting views of such key concepts as hierarchy, 
power, knowledge and learning in organizations. Given that each type of 
explanation contains a grain of truth, the challenge is to connect them. 
In line with empirical evidence regarding the influence of institutional 
arrangements on techno-economic change, Dosi, Marengo and Nuvolari 
call for an ambitious research programme that addresses the co-evolution 
of organizations, forms of rationality, preferences and technologies.
The chapters comprising Part IV discuss some of the themes that run 
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through Hodgson’s contributions to evolutionary economics, starting 
with his portrayal of Alfred Marshall as an evolutionist influenced more 
by Herbert Spencer than by Charles Darwin. Without denying Spencer’s 
role, Stanley Metcalfe (Chapter 14) suggests that there is a Darwinian 
dimension in Marshall’s evolutionary thinking. The idea that a theory of 
evolution requires variety generation and variety elimination, Metcalfe 
elaborates, is reflected in Marshall’s organic account of the process of 
firm differentiation through division of labour and integration through 
organization, and his selectionist account of the competitive struggle 
for existence. At the heart of this process lies the widely misunderstood 
concept of the representative firm, which captures the changing composi-
tion of competitors within an industry population, and is itself  constantly 
changing. Capitalism, from Marshall’s perspective, is never at rest because 
the economically valuable knowledge upon which it is based is not, and 
cannot be, at rest. Fundamentally, economic change rests on epistemic 
foundations because the modern business world is organized to generate 
and apply new knowledge.
Economists since Marshall have drawn on the analogy between market 
competition and the Darwinian struggle for existence. Hodgson and other 
modern evolutionary economists have gone beyond this analogy to sug-
gest that the ontological similarities between evolution in economics and 
evolution in nature warrant a Generalized Darwinism. This perspective 
integrates Darwin’s notions of survival selection and group selection into a 
theory of multi-level selection. In the process, as J.W. Stoelhorst (Chapter 
15) explains, the idea of sexual selection, which Darwin used to explain 
why traits that are wasteful from the point of view of survival selection 
may nonetheless evolve, has been overlooked. Drawing on developments 
in evolutionary biology, Stoelhorst shows that the causal logic of sexual 
selection is relevant within the group selection context of the firm, and 
leads to the rejection of Milton Friedman’s famous claim that selection 
forces in the market force firms to behave as if  they were maximizing 
profits. Specifically, it is likely that the bottom-up process of mutual prefer-
ence selection between firms and their employees results in organizational 
cultures that overshoot their functionality in terms of efficiency in product 
markets.
Multi-level selection theories imply viewing groups as units of selection, 
which raises a number of ontological and methodological questions. 
Friedrich Hayek grappled with these issues. Indeed, Hayek’s recogni-
tion that group selection plays an important role in cultural evolution, 
understood as the propagation of practices or rules of conduct, relies 
on the idea of downward causation, which seems to conflict with his 
defence of methodological individualism. Viktor Vanberg (Chapter 16) 
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proposes an interpretation of Hayek’s thought that resolves this tension. 
Since the explanatory power of group selection hinges on the specifica-
tion of a mechanism that translates group advantages into incentives for 
the required individual behaviour, the question is how higher levels of 
selection impose constraints on lower levels of selection. At every level 
of social organization, Vanberg argues, constitutional choices that are 
shaped by external competition define the rules of internal competition, 
down to the level of individual actions. Upward causation, originating in 
individual actions, remains the ultimate driving force in the hierarchy of 
social organizational levels.
Hodgson’s belief  that economic explanations must rest on a combina-
tion of general and specific theories underpins his defence of Generalized 
Darwinism: the Darwinian principles of variation, inheritance and selec-
tion are necessary, but insufficient, in any analysis of evolving complex 
systems. Jack Vromen (Chapter 17) shows this claim to be problematic: 
Generalized Darwinism is not only insufficient, it is sometimes also 
unnecessary. The argument relies on the distinction between ultimate 
explanations in terms of natural selection, which explain the distribution 
of certain patterns of behaviour within a population, and proximate expla-
nations, which focus on how the interplay of external and internal factors 
causes individuals within the population to behave in certain ways. While 
the two types of explanation can and should mutually inform each other, 
they are both equally legitimate. Fundamentally, for Vromen, evolutionary 
explanations are ill-suited to explain certain kinds of human motivation 
and behaviour. To understand morality and routines, for example, non-
evolutionary proximate explanations are required.
For Hodgson, routines are dispositions for certain collective behaviours, 
as opposed to actual collective behaviours, in the same way that habits are 
not individual behaviour but dispositions to behave in certain ways. Habits 
have temporal and ontological priority over intention and reason, and 
play a key role in the mutual constitution of individuals and structures. 
In effect, institutions influence individual behaviour by influencing indi-
viduals’ habits which, when shared in an organizational context, grow into 
routines. Markus Becker (Chapter 18) performs a citation analysis on busi-
ness and management journals in order to assess the impact of these ideas. 
The analysis reveals not only a great interest among management scholars 
in Hodgson’s work on routines, firm competences and evolution, but also 
the existence of significant untapped opportunities for advancing manage-
ment theory. Specifically, Becker contends, a habit-based conception of 
human agency fits phenomena involving individual-level or organization-
level behavioural inertia. It therefore offers a basis for attempts to change 
individual behaviour or induce organizational change, which is different 
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from relying on incentives or information that merely alter objective or 
perceived costs and benefits.
Although interest in industry dynamics, organizational ecology and 
other evolutionary perspectives has grown among management scholars, 
particularly in the strategy and organizations literatures, the nature and 
operation of the selection processes at work have received very little 
attention. Thorbjørn Knudsen (Chapter 19) proposes a simple model of 
organizational evolution designed to examine how selection processes 
influence the evolution of organizational productivity and fitness. A 
series of experiments illustrate how the nature of the selection process 
and the level of selection pressure influence the population-wide level of 
fitness and productivity over time. The simulation results show that the 
distinction between subset selection and successor selection has important 
consequences. Furthermore, the results reveal that it is crucial to consider 
how selection operates on actual phenotypic properties while identifying 
the underlying genotypic properties that are transmitted in processes 
of organizational replication. Researchers, Knudsen concludes, should 
carefully consider how these processes and properties are expressed in 
populations of social organizations.
Modern evolutionary economics, write Kurt Dopfer and Jason Potts 
(Chapter 20), is at its best in simulation or theoretical modelling, or in 
devising broad theoretical schemes. Yet it remains empirically weak because 
the basic elements of an evolutionary approach – behaviours, habits, 
routines, technologies and institutions – are neither naturally nor easily 
quantitative, and unlike the market outcomes studied in the neoclassical 
framework, do not generate data in the process of their operations. Given 
its concern with qualitative phenomena, most notably the ideas, knowledge 
and generic rules that an economic order is made of, Dopfer and Potts 
argue that the principal methodological challenge facing evolutionary 
economics as a science requires the translation of theoretical constructs 
into empirical measures. This endeavour can be usefully organized around 
the micro-meso-macro analytical framework in which the basic empirical 
measures are the various dimensions of a meso unit: heterogeneity, variety, 
frequency. The generic taxonomy of orders, classes and phases of a rule 
provides the architecture for developing a comprehensive map of the 
measure space of an evolving economy.
The volume concludes, in Part V, with a conversation with Hodgson. 
The interviews we conducted (Chapter 21) cover many, but by no means 
all, of the important topics addressed by the other contributors. The con-
versation clarifies some of the main threads that run through Hodgson’s 
work, and supplements many of the points made in preceding chapters. 
Among the topics addressed are the problems with the neoclassical utility 
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maximization framework, the necessity to include moral motivations in 
a theory of human behaviour, and the requirement that such a theory be 
consistent with evidence from evolutionary biology and psychology. These 
considerations lead to a distinction between different kinds of, and reasons 
for, rule-following behaviour. The discussion moves on to address key 
aspects of Hodgson’s methodology, and then turns to his assessment of 
the present position of heterodox economics. We close with an overview of 
the strategy of the Journal of Institutional Economics and interdisciplinary 
institutional research more generally.
1.3 CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The chapters in this Festschrift cover many of the important topics in eco-
nomic methodology, institutional economics and evolutionary economics 
that Hodgson has contributed to.3 Taken together, they also reveal key 
features of the ‘Hodgson brand’. These recognizable aspects of Hodgson’s 
writing include his firm commitment to pluralism and interdisciplinar-
ity, his capacity to integrate insights from the social sciences and the 
natural sciences, and his insistence that the constructive dialogue among 
 researchers, both within and across disciplinary boundaries, is seriously 
impaired by the absence of linguistic precision and clear (taxonomic) 
definitions. Incisive and comprehensive accounts of the history of the 
concepts he engages with, and the breadth of the literature thus covered, 
are also characteristic of Hodgson’s work. Like many others, we have been 
profoundly influenced by Hodgson, and owe him a debt of gratitude.4 It is 
an honour to count him as a mentor and a friend.
NOTES
1. In addition to 19 monographs (including two forthcoming books) and 11 edited volumes, 
Hodgson has published over 350 articles in journals and books. The full list can be con-
sulted at https://www.geoffreymhodgson.uk. According to Google Scholar, Hodgson’s 
work has attracted over 37,000 citations, including an average of over 2,300 in each of the 
past ten years.
2. Hodgson played a pivotal role in the formation of the European Association for 
Evolutionary Political Economy (EAEPE) in 1988 and the World Interdisciplinary 
Network for Institutional Research (WINIR) in 2013. He established the Journal of 
Institutional Economics through EAEPE in 2004 and has served as its Editor-in-Chief 
ever since. Since the publication of the first issue in 2005, the journal has grown in vis-
ibility and prominence. It is currently sponsored by both EAEPE and WINIR, as well as 
by the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics (SASE).
3. Given the breadth of Hodgson’s contributions, it is hardly surprising that a number of 
themes that have mattered in his career are absent in this volume. The most important 
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missing theme revolves around the place of Karl Marx in Hodgson’s thought, and 
includes topics such as socialism, planning and utopia.
4. We both had the good fortune of being, first, Hodgson’s PhD students and, second, his 
colleagues at the University of Hertfordshire.
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